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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * 
CINDY DUBOIS, ) 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) Appeal No. 920649-CA 
vs. ) 
) (Oral Argument 
GRAND CENTRAL d/b/a ) Priority No. 16) 
FRED MEYER, ) 
Defendant-Appellee. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County is Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-
2 (3) (j) (1988); and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court by order 
dated September 30, 1992. 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION? This 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant v. Park 
City. 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY ON THE 
GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER? This is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant. supra. 
C. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER? This is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant, supra. 
D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR 
SLANDER BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED 
MEYER? This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Marchant, supra. 
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III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances or rules whose interpretation is believed to be solely 
determinative of the outcome of this case. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
in District Court. 
On January 2, 1991 Cindy Dubois, a seventeen year 
employee of Fred Meyer, purchased a computer from Fred Meyer 
utilizing certain employee discounts and at a price she believed 
to be the correct price. (R. at 140-143). She was terminated 
without prior notice by Fred Meyer on January 4, 1991 as a result 
of that purchase. Ms. Dubois was informed that she was terminated 
by Fred Meyer for dishonesty and for taking an unauthorized 
discount. 
Ms. Dubois, the Plaintiff in this case, instituted this 
action to recover damages for wrongful termination, breach of the 
employment agreement, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
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and slander relating to her termination as an employee on January 
4, 1991. 
Fred Meyer answered the complaint and filed a counter-
claim for the difference in purchase price of the computer. The 
counter-claim is not in dispute. The parties conducted discovery 
by way of Ms. Dubois talcing the depositions of several key Fred 
Meyer employees. Fred Meyer took the deposition of Ms. Dubois. 
Fred Meyer then filed the motion for Summary Judgment 
which was responded to by Ms. Dubois. Ms. Dubois also filed a 
motion to amend her complaint which was granted and resulted in the 
Plaintiff's first amended complaint. This is the complaint that 
was dismissed in total pursuant to Fred Meyer's motion. 
At the hearing on the motion for Summary Judgment, no 
transcript was made, but the Court made oral findings, some of 
which are incorporated in the Court's Order and granted the Summary 
Judgment filed by Fred Meyer. Ms. Dubois filed her Notice of 
Appeal on July 8, 1992. There has been no cross-appeal filed in 
the action. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff Cindy Dubois had been an employee of Grand 
Central Corporation, d/b/a Fred Meyer for approximately seventeen 
years when the operative facts concerning this case occurred. 
During Ms. Dubois's seventeen years of employment, she 
served as a manager and assistant manager of the photo-electronics 
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department, as a sales clerk, as a cashier and organized and 
conducted training for photo-electronics personnel of Fred Meyer. 
(R. at 214-222). 
While employed as a sales clerk for Fred Meyer, Ms. 
Dubois had become aware of a Leading Technology computer, Model 
No. 6800SX, which had a sale price on the Fred Meyer computer 
pricing system of $999.97. She was interested in purchasing the 
computer for that price (R. at 222-239) 
Fred Meyer has as it's principal source of information 
regarding prices and goods, a computer pricing system referred as 
the CEM system (R. at 141). This system is the corporate wide 
system Fred Meyer uses to provide an immediate price reference for 
employees regarding any and all goods within the corporate system. 
It goes without saying that the ability to know up to date prices 
on an immediate, on-going basis is critical for a retail store such 
as those run by Fred Meyer. 
On December 31, 1990, Ms. Dubois telephoned Mr. Gary 
Jones, a buyer employed by Fred Meyer regarding the price of the 
computer. Mr. Jones was located in the Portland, Oregon office of 
Fred Meyer. Ms. Dubois explained to Mr. Jones that she had a 
question about whether or not the price she had seen on the CEM 
system for the Leading Technology 680OSX computer was correct and 
was calling to verify that price. Ms. Dubois had previously been 
trained to know that questions concerning Fred Meyer product prices 
would be resolved immediately in the CEM pricing system. (R. at 
140-144). 
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Mr. Jones checked the price and indicated to Ms. Dubois 
that it appeared that the price was mistaken, but stated to her 
that he would investigate the situation and immediately fix it if 
it was not correct. (R. at 141,229-230, 232). 
At all relevant times, Ms. Dubois had been informed that 
the prices referenced on the CEM were the company's authorized 
prices and could be relied upon by employees for the purposes of 
selling and purchasing goods from Fred Meyer. (R. at 141). 
Ms. Dubois did not work on January 1, 1991. As soon as 
she came into work on January 2, 1991, Ms. Dubois checked the price 
of the 6800SX Leading Technology computer in the CEM pricing system 
and found the same price as previously of $999.97. (R. at 141-144). 
Mr. Jones made no contact with Ms. Dubois at any time to 
indicate that he had verified the correct price of the computer 
other than as stated in his December 31, 1990 telephone 
conversation. (R. at 247-250). In the evening of January 2, 1991, 
after she was done working for the day, Ms. Dubois purchased the 
computer and took it home. (R. at 141-144)." " 
Under no circumstance did Ms. Dubois seek to hide the 
purchase of the computer system from Fred Meyer, but purchased the 
computer openly and directly, through a well known work associate 
and paid by her own personal check. (R. at 232-238). 
Ms. Dubois did not work on January 3, 1991. On January 
4, 1991, Ms. Dubois came to work and received a phone call from 
Mr. Cox, an associate at another local Fred Meyer store, who 
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informed her that she was going to be forced to quit because of 
her purchase of the computer (R. at 140-144). 
Ms. Dubois then immediately obtained from the CEM System 
the document which is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit 
1 (R. at 107) which indicated the same $999.97 price for the 
computer as previously referenced in the CEM on January 2, 1991, 
when she purchased the computer. As noted on Exhibit 1 to the 
Amended Complaint (R. at 107) the price is listed at $999.97, two 
days after Ms. Dubois purchased the computer. 
Shortly thereafter, on the morning of January 4, 1991, 
Ms. Dubois was called to the security offices of the Bountiful Fred 
Meyer store and informed she was being fired because she took the 
computer out of the store allegedly knowing that the price was 
wrong thus giving Fred Meyer grounds to fire her. (R. at 243-244) 
Ms. Dubois was aware of the existence of the Fred Meyer 
policy in effect, Exhibit 2 to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
(R. at 108) which only permits immediate termination of employees 
without prior warning for acts such as taking unauthorized 
discounts and for dishonesty and those others enumerated on the 
Fred Meyer policy. (R. at 108). At no time until after this 
litigation was filed, was Ms. Dubois informed that she was being 
terminated for failing to follow a supervisor's directions. (R. at 
143-144). 
Never at any time was any documentation produced or 
provided to Ms. Dubois prior to her termination to show the price 
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of the computer was in fact $1,999.97 as claimed by Fred Meyer. 
(R. at 144). 
The Fred Meyer employee who sold the computer to Ms. 
Dubois was never aware of two Leading Technology computers having 
the same model number with different prices. (R. at 150). Fred 
Meyer alleged the existence of a "shell" Leading Technology 6800SX 
Computer, that cost the $997.97, while the one Ms. Dubois bought 
allegedly cost $1997.97. (R. at 199). This "shell theory" is the 
entire basis for the termination justification by Fred Meyer. 
Disputed and contradictory testimony exists in the 
depositions of Fred Meyer employees Gary Jones and Dennis Robson 
(R. at 181-189, 168-171) on the issue of what was actually stated 
to Ms. Dubois regarding the computer and also the information that 
Mr. Jones was to provide to Ms. Dubois regarding the corrected 
price. (R. at 168-171, 181-190). 
In fact, Mr. Jones sent by normal first class mail from 
Portland, Oregon a notice to the Bountiful, Utah, store which 
arrived in the store the day after Ms. Dubois was terminated, (5 
days after her telephone call to Mr. Jones), stating that the price 
of the computer was $1999.97. (R. at 247-250). The common practice 
(and the logical one regarding a potential sale of a large priced 
item) would have been to update the price instantaneously on the 
CEM System or provide the information by FAX or telephone to Ms. 
Dubois. 
As set forth in the Affidavit of Ms. Dubois (R. at 140-
144), and in the deposition of Jan Williams (R. at 156-157) other 
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Fred Meyer employees had been discussing the fact that she would 
be forced to leave Fred Meyer as a result of this computer issue 
prior to her even knowing there was a problem. 
As set forth in the deposition transcripts (R. at 146-
190) in opposition to Fred Meyer's motion for Summary Judgment, 
there are multiple discrepancies in the testimonies of the various 
Fred Meyer employees concerning who knew about the price problem, 
what the actual price of the computer was, and when the Fred Meyer 
employees became aware of this "shell theory", concerning the other 
computer price for $999.97. All such testimony except that of Mr. 
Jones is based upon inadmissible hearsay. 
As set forth in the Plaintiff's statement disputed 
statement of facts section, (R. at 117-128), the Fred Meyer 
employees had multiple problems with the representations made in 
their depositions concerning the "investigation" they conducted. 
Mr. Jones testified that he did in fact check the price 
and stated that it was wrong. However, he failed to notify anyone, 
including Ms. Dubois, by way of documentation or correction in the 
pricing system in the Bountiful, Utah store until that store 
received the document he sent from Portland, Oregon, which arrived 
in Bountiful, Utah on January 5, 1991, the day after Ms. Dubois was 
terminated. 
The remaining Fred Meyer employees who participated in 
the alleged investigation of the facts and termination of Ms. 
Dubois testified unanimously that they did not check the computer 
price themselves but relied solely on the representation of Mr. 
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Jones to some of them that the price was incorrect. (R. at 146-
190). Such employees actions were reliance upon what would be in 
court inadmissable hearsay evidence. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION? 
It is Ms. Dubois' position that while she was generally 
an employee-at-will with Fred Meyer, the terms of the employment-
at-will agreement were modified by the terms of the Fred Meyer 
employee termination policy which constituted terms of an 
employment contract between Ms. Dubois and Fred Meyer. (R. at 
108). 
This legal position is supported by the case law of 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, LTD., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). It is 
also admitted by the Defendant. (R. at 74). 
Fred Meyer's only rights to terminate Ms. Dubois without 
prior notice were under the terms of the employment agreement, 
Exhibit 2 to the Amended Complaint (R. at 108). The existence and 
use of the Fred Meyer policy as it's basis for termination, permits 
a challenge by Ms. Dubois to the grounds set forth by Fred Meyer 
for her termination. The Court granted Fred Meyer's Motion for 
Summary Judgment solely on the grounds that if there was no 
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pretextual reason for Ms. Dubois' termination, that under the 
Russell v. Oaden Union Rv. & Depot, Co., 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 1952) 
case, a Utah court has no authority to question the reasonableness 
of the termination based upon Fred Meyer's review of the facts in 
reaching it's termination conclusion. 
Such an outrageous position totally precludes an employee 
from having the right of judicial review of an employer's 
termination grounds under an employee agreement such as existed in 
this case. The Russell, supra case does not support the 
proposition as alleged by Fred Meyer. 
Ms. Dubois set forth sufficient facts from the 
depositions of the various Fred Meyer employees, and from her own 
affidavit, to establish multiple material questions of fact 
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when such facts 
were construed in her favor as must be done in a summary judgment 
motion against her. Such facts clearly show, when so construed, 
that the Fred Meyer employees' decision to terminate Ms. Dubois was 
based solely on the hearsay received from Mr. Gary Jones. 
Thereafter, the Fred Meyer employees who heard the statements of 
Mr. Jones made the decision to terminate based upon his information 
without performing any independent review and without verifying the 
existence or substance of the pricing information and/or error 
claimed by Ms. Dubois. How can a review be reasonable without 
hearing the other side of the story and investigating it? It is 
the position of Ms. Dubois that this was both a factually 
inaccurate investigation and was conducted in a reckless manner; 
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that it did not support termination of Ms. Dubois on the stated 
grounds of dishonesty and for taking an unauthorized discount. The 
grounds used by Fred Meyer for Ms. Dubois' termination constitute 
severe employee black marks on the record of a faithful seventeen 
year employee and substantially impairs her ability to be employed 
in the future. Such grounds constituted a breach by Fred Meyer of 
the employment agreement and wrongful termination of Ms. Dubois 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY ON THE 
GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER? 
The Trial Court did not address in oral argument or in 
any specific findings other than set forth in the Order it's 
grounds for dismissal of Ms. Dubois' claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The only source of information 
upon which this Court can rely in concluding what the Trial Court 
was thinking is a review of the various Memoranda in support of 
and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. It can be 
perhaps supposed that the Trial Court, in making the finding that 
there was no evidence presented of a pretextual termination, 
therefore believed that the absence of a pretextual termination 
constituted the absence of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. This is not stated in the Court's ruling nor on any 
record and is mere guess work because the Court failed to set forth 
in detail the grounds for such finding. 
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Ms. Dubois asserts that this failure to specifically 
identify the basis for it's finding was error. The cases cited by 
Ms. Dubois in her Reply Memorandum provide ample support for the 
proposition that a claim of intentionally inflicted emotional 
distress is not one appropriate for Summary Judgment. 
In the extant case, if the facts were accepted as true 
as set forth by Ms. Dubois in her pleadings, in the depositions 
cited and in her affidavit, Fred Meyer made a decision to terminate 
her based upon a reckless, if not intentional failure to adequately 
investigate the circumstances surrounding her purchase of the 
computer, and the resultant communications of the decision to 
terminate her to other employees. Such reckless action, 
constitutes emotional abuse to her after seventeen years of 
faithful service and is at least arguably an intentional (and/or 
reckless) infliction of emotional abuse which justifies 
compensation, or at the very least a review by an impartial finder 
of fact. 
C. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER? 
It is the position of Ms. Dubois that while Utah courts 
have indicated there is not an implied covenant of faith and faith 
dealing regarding an employee at-will in Utah, under the cases of 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah 1991) and 
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Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992), the 
Supreme Court did not specifically reject an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts which modify 
the employment-at-will relationship. 
In this case, Ms. Dubois did have employment agreement 
with Fred Meyer. Fred Meyer could not terminate her without prior 
notice except for the occurrence of certain circumstances. Fred 
Meyer did terminate Ms. Dubois without prior notice and alleged to 
do so based upon the occurrence of some of those certain 
circumstances. Ms. Dubois clearly should have the right to 
challenge whether the allegations made by Fred Meyer to 
substantiate it's immediate termination action were made in good 
faith, were investigated in good faith and in fact were accurate. 
The Trial Court's decision has precluded this review. Ms. Dubois 
had an employment agreement and should be entitled to require good 
faith and fair dealing regarding it's application. 
D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR 
SLANDER BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED 
MEYER? 
As the case of Ms. Dubois' claim regarding intentional 
infliction of emotional abuse, the Court dismissed Ms. Dubois' 
claim for slander without any reference in argument or written 
finding, except the unsupported statement in the Order, which 
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referenced the briefs of Fred Meyer as setting forth the grounds 
dismissal of this particular claim. 
As s e t f 01 III] i II I. In ippos iiiiitj Memo r a m I ri I" H". Puhi i B , 
her affidavit and the deposition testimony from Mr. Jan Williams 
I | 'ii .1 | , ] "^  ii "Mi
 { multiple employees were advised •: - Ms. 
Dubois' alleged problem regarding the compm -. 
prior her being aware of the probler • - employees were not 
L. " uupr • * the termination 
decision D- r'red Meyer. 
The a negation made by Fred Meyer of conditional 
privilege Brehany, supiu 
apply However, given the burden '" ~ Nummary Judgment motion, 
where all facts are to be construed ^ f avoir of the non-moving 
party, without a showing that any 
advised the problem of Ms. Dubois prior > her termination and 
--'""' • '->-• "z t o E -ue conditional privilege 
ni. alleged "need question ^ ^ c t a- t-
addressed Judge Murphy. Also ignored . <-, Court 
wl i e L h e i' ¥ M e y e i di'' I' eel w 1.1, hi 
lack of g faith. See Haueter v. Cowles Publishing, Co., 811 
P.2d 231 (Wash. App. 1991). 
Ad< i 11 j una I I y " U J IJ J I »I I I i 111 i ii1 111 \ij i ,, <j L11<11 u i 1 11 
permitting the taking evidence, the decision to terminate Ms. 
Dubois baseri upon controverted "facts" assembled by Fred Meyer to 
allege the existence of a "reasonable" investigation precludes 
proving, t~_ alleged by Ms. Dubois, the total failure of 
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justification by Fred Meyer to terminate her without prior notice. 
Such evidence should preclude a summary judgment motion and was set 
forth in the affidavit of Ms. Dubois and deposition testimony 
submitted in opposition to Fred Meyer's motion. The District Court 
has totally precluded an employee from any opportunity to clear her 
name in front of a trier of fact and has given an employer the 
present right under Utah Law to make any statement it chooses 
concerning an employee, to allege a "reasonable investigation" of 
the facts, to have a conditional privilege to tell everyone in the 
organization the problem from the employer's point of view, to not 
permit evidence on the issue of malice, and then have given the 
employer immunity from litigation challenging the "reasonableness", 
"truthfulness", and legal right of the employer to make such 
statements. 
Under this case, Utah employers have been granted the 
ability and legal right to make whatever false, distorted or 
unsupported statement they desire to justify their termination of 
an employee and the Utah courts will not permit an employee the 
right to challenge the underlying facts in court. This is clear 
error and must be rectified. 
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VI. 
ZVPPFT.T.ZXMT'S ARGUMENTS 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH 0 1 ' THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT Il , 'liONGFUL •TERMINATION. " ' 
The basic premise r Motion of Summary Judgment is 
that it' iit. il be denied , • dence present ;t m e 
issue ul material fact, which resolved ,. . - -he non-
moving party, will entitle tna- non-moving party r ~ decision as 
a mat ter of 3 a w\ See Beehive Brick Co. u Robinson Brick Co » 
P.2d 827 (Utah Ct App, 1989); Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d i 
(Utah 1982). 
• In I he ,:.d!bf, ml; jy[Quritain states Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, 681 P. 2d 1258 (Utah 1984), the Court indicated that 
findings were not necessary to support :i t:s motion for summary 
judgment but: where findings are made and their content evidences 
material issues ••- summary judgment is precluded. ;. the 
extant case j 
party, which are material issues of fact that are controverted. 
(R. at 312-31' rh.i- ;s error and should be reversed. 
at °"!^ -314 Court found Fred Meyer substantial basis 
for termination decision. Thi^ c' findinc f fact 
whe oving 
party. This is error 
Material questions of fact exist regarding each addressed 
issue, which for some reason the Trial Court resolved in favor of 
the moving party, rather than the non-moving party. Also questions 
of law arose which the Trial Court decided in direct opposition to 
the current law in existence in the State of Utah. 
The key case Fred Meyer cited in it's Motion for Summary 
Judgment to support its premise for termination of Ms. Dubois is 
Russell v. Oaden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 247 P.2d 1957 (Utah 1952). 
The Russell, supra case is inapplicable in this 
particular instance. In that case, both sides had an opportunity 
to have their facts reviewed. That did not happen in the extant 
case. Application of the Russell case, the Trial Court's 
conclusion from that case and the argument of Fred Meyer in it's 
Memoranda (R. at 202-204) would place an employee in Utah who 
operated under an employment agreement such as the one in this case 
(R. at 108), in a position where such employee has no right to 
challenge in court a decision to terminate under a stated policy, 
if the employer (without input from the employee) presents 
affidavits, depositions, or some other alleged evidence whereby the 
employer's counsel can argue that the employer made some kind of 
"reasonable investigation" of the circumstances. If this in fact 
is a tenant of Utah law, it is not set forth in any clearly 
distinguishable manner and totally denies an employee their rights 
of due process to challenge the conclusions or the underlying 
rationale of any such termination decision. 
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In this instance, Ms. Dubois's Amended Complaint included 
a complaint for wrongful termination and breach of employment 
agreemen t © 
entitled : nave >: ract nan* determination the 
actions ci Mi employer were reasonable, accurate reckless 
relating to the decision terminate based t 
agreement. Otherwise, the stated premises under which termination 
i 
"The employer can unilaterally decide if the employee 
has breached any of the terms hereof and no court challenge to that 
decision is permitted under Utah Law." 
forced to accept unchallenged the stated conclusions 
employer. and employment agreement would therefore be 
terminated once . employer makes meager sho* 
an investigation Surely Investigation, i r reasonable, must be 
based upon facts from both - - - -
 d L e 
it challenged. 
Under Judge Murplr rationale < », ~ finding in an 
e \ i il e n L i a r > H e t; 1: ,1 n C| I  1/ lr I. 11 < • , a a 11,1 a I 1 ) >" w a s 
reasonable can be considered by a co in, Ut.ah, 
Dubois' Memorandum Opposition Motion 
J I')! IjliJiTIHIdt
 :, u u y i m , il1' L i | , i e UK;1! I "111 I I r i t ivc i , i 1 d i C c i S Wl 
contested factual uestions regarding whether 
investigation was reasonable or simply fabricated iustify the 
employer's predetermined decision i: Ilk „ .il lit- i Ati <-se al s< » the 
transcript pages which are attached Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 146-
190). 
Fred Meyer has admitted that an employment contract 
existed in this matter. See page 7 of their Memorandum in support 
of their Summary Judgment. (R. at 205). The case law of Berube, 
supra, clarifies this issue. Therefore, the relationship is not 
treated as one at-will but one governed by the terms of the 
contract. There are clear material and genuine questions of fact 
as to whether or not that contract has been breached by virtue of 
the alleged conduct of Ms. Dubois and of Fred Meyer. The very 
existence of a document (R. at 145) that existed the day after the 
termination of Ms. Dubois should create enough of a material 
question of fact to preclude summary judgment if the standard for 
such motions is appropriately applied. In the Brehany, supra case 
at 56, the Court indicated that if there are terms of an employee 
policy which limit the employer's right to discharge, then a 
Plaintiff has a right to put on evidence that the employer did in 
fact breach the terms of the employee policy regarding discharge 
and such evidence is primarily a factual issue. The evidence that 
is relevant to that termination includes the language of the 
policy, the employer's course of conduct and pertinent acts and 
representations. All of these items are facts for a jury to 
consider. 
The Trial Court clearly ignored the above stated elements 
from the Brehany, supra case and such refusal to recognize the 
right of the Plaintiff to put on evidence on these issues as to 
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whether the employment contract was breached, and whether a 
wrongful termination occurred, constitutes clear error that must 
l i e in e « » e i | . \ e< III, \ti i ! hi ! I n inidiil ! M I ! I M I I H D H ^ I I I 11 I I'm I i i i I  I ' I H I I I I i u a 
t r i a l on the evidence. 
I MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY 31 THE 
GROUNDS FORTH II I TEE BRIEF C I: 1 IE IS IE I fEYER. 
3' is clearly a material question of fact whether or not 
Fred Meyer made i 
either correct or incorrect information and/or assumptions. If 
those assumptions and information wrong and were recklessly or 
i v. -; 
adequately explore the relevant informatioi 3, made up 
stories as a ] ] eged by Ms. Dubois to support their decision to 
ter,ii!iiidf„.el ( s' :t : l:i as t: iheii: "she J I theory), then a prima facia case 
exists based upon :.ht pleadings and affidavits of Ms. Dubois for 
the intentional infliction uf emot lonnl <h«tre&fi Mr dei I lie 
standard for summary judgments, Dubois is entitled tc have the 
facts construed < . favor. See Jackson, supra. Ms. Dubois has 
been der I n 5 
assessed . , \ ,act. 
The Trial Court provided no insight into it' s thinking 
o n ii i s m i s s MI 111 I 111..- i 11111. ti 1J1 i ,i i • I 11 J I I I I I I I I I I J e r e f t > i i j 1 \ i e c»r i II)" b a s i s 
for it's conclusion, for purposes of this appeal, are the arguments 
set forth in the Fred Meyer's Memorandum in support of it's support 
for Summary Judgment. (R. at 205-206). 
Ms. Dubois rebutted those arguments in her Memorandum in 
Opposition (R.~at 134), and supporting documentation. 
The Utah cases of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 
1961) and Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 698 (Utah 1985) indicate 
this case is not a likely one for summary judgment. 
If the Trial Court truly construed the facts in favor of 
Ms. Dubois, just the existence of a document (R. at 145) supporting 
her case, from the records of Fred Meyer, which was never reviewed 
by Fred Meyer prior to terminating her even though she asked for 
it to be reviewed, (R. at 141-144, 146-190) constitutes the 
necessary arguable element of recklessness or intent to inflict 
emotional distress. Ms. Dubois is entitled to this inference and 
others as set forth in the record. The Trial Court erroneously 
failed to grant her such inferences. 
The evidence is clear that Dennis Robson, Ms. Dubois' 
immediate supervisor in his deposition at page 16 (R. at 188), 
admits Fred Meyer made a mistake on pricing the computer that is 
at the very heart of this issue. This admission also justifies a 
finding that a question of fact exists over whether the decision 
to terminate was done recklessly based on mistaken data or for some 
other reason. Fred Meyer made at least one serious admitted 
mistake regarding pricing of the computer. Ms. Dubois has pointed 
out multiple other mistakes. These should be construed in her 
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favor, against Fred Meyer in, a motion for summary judgmen* at 
140-190). 
The Utah I (IM I FMA Acceptance Co. J . Leatherby Ins., 
Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1972) indicates that in negligence cases 
ordinarily questions of far- -re presented that need to be resolved 
by a fact-finder and it . ien i Jj*-« il drill M iiie mid i sputedl miiid 
where reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that 
sin Ih appropriate for summary 
judgment In cases ot .ntentiona •, heavily laden with 
contested facts, the burden • meeting the standard for summary 
judgmen l sin m hi I n I 
The investigating employees Fred Meyer admittedly 
never even did their own independent investigation into the pricing 
problem, except i u n t , r 1 1 1 1 11t1 m: 
participate " - * . termination decision. The investigating and 
terminat - relied - y uu hearsay. As set forth in 
the Haueter r supra case at 2J. 
"Inadmissible hearsay evidence cannot considered in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment " 
All the terminating employees except Mr, Jones relied on 
hearsay as their evidence for termination. How could such evidence 
s u p p o i l. in mi if in in I i ' liiiiiikii v l u d w i n e r i l ' T h e i: i i ] « s i h o u Il d b e :i t 
cannot Such employees would not even be permitted to testify as 
to their grounds for termination because they did no independent 
investigation except hearsay. 
Clearly, a trier of fact could make the determination 
that Fred Meyer's admitted mistake regarding the computer's pricing 
and its resulting decision to terminate Ms. Dubois based upon her 
reliance upon the Fred Meyer pricing system were an intentional or 
reckless acts in light of the Fred Meyer termination policy and 
therefore an intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Ms. 
Dubois. This is how the factual issues should be resolved. To not 
permit a trier of fact to see that evidence was clear error on the 
part of the Trial Court and such order must be reversed, with the 
issue permitted to go to trial. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER. 
Under the most recent case of Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 
194 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992) the Supreme Court reiterated that 
there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
relating to employment relationships when they are entirely at-
will. The question which has not been answered is whether there 
is such a covenant attached to specific employment contracts, 
commitments or agreements which alter the traditional at-will 
employment contract. Ms. Dubois claims such a covenant exists. 
In Heslop, supra at 24, the Court stated that under the 
rationale of the case of Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd. 771 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989), an employer may create an implied-in-fact 
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contract for employment that takes the relationship beyond 
employment at-wiU , by making representations such as those set 
f
 ti,i ..I ,i„! I111!1, i Supi eme Liuil Ltiei. tou.JI in 
Heslop, supra at 2 4 ttt.it it was reasonable to require an employer 
who made such representations as those found : 
agreemen require such employers to stand by their 
promises made in that modification of the employment at-will 
agreement. 
The requirement *-~ "~+* 4~ r — J faith relating to the 
terms of the policy set forth v\:- matter -e; lot 
create new, widepencle'.'l i" , - cigreea . :he 
parties, which was the Court's concern the Brehany, supra and 
Heslop, supra cases. What the employment agreement does i s re qui :i :! i: e 
I lid1 t\ i1. 'I.1 " i i IIU. |.Ft;«.:j t J cd IJ y agreed employer has an 
obligation to act: with good faith and fair dealing towards those 
specific elements which 
i <* extant matter, * admitted :, r. ^ es c-t 
a II employment ontract exist eiar - Fred Meyer 
termination Amended 
Complaint .<-c :.- ^cu^ ^red Meyer's Memorandum 
support of it's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
"I11"i« i '" i > i 11" i < .1" H in i b s i. 11 y t 1 \ e Amended Complaint 
the Plaintiff specifically says there is no implied covenant 
good faith and fair dealings i n Utah foi employment: cnnl.r 
TIIM » *»i •» r . iK'Mif., "etjdl conclusion that must be corrected. 
Marchant, supra. The Courts of this state need to specifically 
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address whether there is an obligation to act in good faith and 
with fair dealing towards those specific agreements which do not 
fall within or modify the employment at-will doctrine. 
The Brehany, supra case at 55 states: 
"Of course the at-will doctrine may be altered by terms 
contained in an employment manual...However, in the absence of 
express terms limiting the right of an employer to discharge for 
any or no reason and in the absence of provisions establishing 
procedures by which a discharge should be effectuated, it would be 
inconsistent to hold that an employer, on the basis of the implied 
covenant of good faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the 
employers right to discharge." 
It is clear that the Supreme Court has placed a 
limitation on the cause of action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing relating to strictly at-
will employment arrangements. What is not clear, is whether that 
extends to employment relationships which are modified by the terms 
of an expressed limitation such as in this case. Where the 
employer has a right to terminate without notice only upon the 
occurrence of certain specified occurrences, the employee is 
entitled to expect that the employer act with good faith and fair 
dealing regarding those specific types of permissible termination 
triggering acts. 
The Trial Court in this case has refused to acknowledge 
this exception to prior Utah rulings and such issue needs to be 
clarified by reversing the Court's decision and remanding this 
matter for trial to determine if Fred Meyer breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing regarding the specific 
terms of the employment agreement in effect (R. at 108). 
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1) THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S 
MOTIOl i i: 0 1 1: SU1 CI IA RY * 
SLANDER BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED 
MEYER. 
Again (.lie "I'Lial Co nil; made no specif i. ixnding regarding 
its dismissal of the claim of slander except solely upon the stated 
basis set forth in t, he argument 
Based upon these arguments, a conditional privilege . •. Fred Meyer 
was the sole basis for dismissal. 
W • I)i :i boi IE mi :i s I: g i less tha t :i E • exact J 5 * ha !:: the 
Court was thinking in order to make hex appellate argument, the 
argument that a conditional privilege should apply Limited. 
1 Uie Brehany . supra case at; pages ::»- issue of 
conditional privilege was addressed and founc apply when the 
communications were protected r 
interested persons concerning the reasons for discharge. 
In the extant case, Jan Williams who was not a supervisor 
o f M s . D u b o i s t i l K I P i n in « 1 1 ii« iiiilin in Ills 11 iniii 11 1 in u | n e i I i h i 1 in 111 l i s . 
Dubois, were advised prior ':e> termination that she was going 
to be disciplined as a result purchase of the computer. 
A n o i InP in w o i " Ik I--"1' 1 1,1 H inprl t iri i" t y . the problem 
at 157). As set forth In the deposition of Jan Williams and Dennis 
Robson (R .1! I 56-157, 181-190) and the affidavit ; 
( 140 - M ' I ) , tl'ii: communications from Mr. Robson to Mr, Williams 
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to Mr. Cox, and others spread quite rapidly relating to an 
allegation that she had a problem regarding the computer. 
Brehany, supra at 59 indicates that evidence of malice 
is needed to overcome the existence of a conditional privilege. 
There, the Court stated that the term "actual malice" is different 
from the term "malice" pertaining to common law versus First 
Amendment defamation law. 
The Court in Brehany, supra at 59 referencing Lind v. 
Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983), indicated that the issue of 
malice is ordinarily a factual issue. 
In the case of Luttrell v. United Telephone System, Inc. 
684 P.2d 1292 (Ct. App. Kansas 1984) that Court indicated on page 
1294, that the essential elements of a qualifiedly privileged 
communication are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement 
limited in it's scope to the upholding of such interest and 
publication in a proper manner only to proper parties. The other 
side of the coin is that the Plaintiff is required to prove that 
the Defendants acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth before the privilege could be overcome. 
In the Haueter, supra case at 235, the Court indicates 
that the word "malice" connotes ill-will or an absence of good 
faith. Whether ill-will or an absence of good faith exists in this 
instance is not, as was focused on by Judge Murphy, merely an issue 
of alleging a pretexual termination, but also the ability to put 
on evidence that the employer had some other kind of ill-will, 
recklessness or intentional disregard toward a party's rights or 
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was acting i~ b?d faith 4^ a-u- termination decision. That m\" v ". . L 
could 1:M testimony * Perry Taylor, Charle 
and i h^ i • *jt-=- depose, 
190) A substantial quest:-? was never answered, the Fred 
Meyer employees did fai adequately reason \ 
the -illegal luos against: . .., , . * * justification did they 
have to terminate her without going through the proper notice 
requirements set •F«,»r i i ndm n fn« Mruployiiienl poJ .icy 
Withou1 s™^ egitimate iactual justification, ill-will, 
recklessnes - by the Fred Meyer employees to slander MR„ 
Dubois - , -he facts are 
construec * - as should be done ; ~r:^ instance. 
Ms. Duboic !^ required t 
: - .. ,r- based upon the 
cases reference above especially for this motion. She 
required to prove that 
Fred Meyer ^aii reckless . atentionai - acted i ::>ad faith 
their investigation and/or termination decision. Such recklessness 
and bad faith of then ferm i iidLii on ranM \\v construed from the 
following material facts: 
I M'-i Dubois has produced a document proving t' it 11 '• 
price for th1 .".•Viipute. '. ! ed arguably was $999.97 two 
days after her purchase of the computer. 
Dubois has produced eviden. 
informed immediately by Mr. Jones it cne 
price was incorrect (»•«? at J 41-144). 
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3. From Ms. Dubois' experience with the company she 
understood pricing issues and questions would be handled 
immediately because of their import. (R. 141-144). 
4. The Fred Meyer employees who made the termination 
decision failed to and refused to look at Ms. Dubois' evidence at 
any time prior to terminating her. (R. at 141-190). 
All of the above certainly presents substantial material 
questions of fact which should defeat any motion for summary 
judgment regarding the issue of slander. Such questions should 
permit Ms. Dubois to put on evidence to see if she can convince a 
trier of fact that Fred Meyer had ill-will or bad faith against her 
as argued herein. If the allegations of Fred Meyer were wrong, and 
had ill-will or a lack of good faith toward Ms. Dubois, (which 
could be construed from Fred Meyer's reckless or intentional acts), 
the Fred Meyer claims of dishonesty would constitute slander of Ms. 
Dubois and any conditional privilege would be negated. 
By virtue of the Trial Court's decision that the claims 
by Fred Meyer were conditionally privileged, or that Fred Meyer's 
attempted "reasonable" investigation could not be challenged in 
court, and by virtue of the dismissal of the claim for slander, 
Ms. Dubois has no way through the court system to challenge the 
representations made to Mr. Williams, Mr. Cox and others that she 
was being terminated for dishonesty or any other reason. This 
black mark must therefore remain on her record without an 
opportunity for third party review or rebuttal! 
30 
What the Trial Court has done Is to make a rule that if 
an employer slanders an employee, communicates that slander among 
i I- i, other *-im|»'»»yee' " ' >i HIIIH in fi i"p employees state - ley 
received such information while conducting an investigation or nhe 
facts or were somehow m a supervisor y loop, no mv 
represent at :i on s . ' *P contrary, absence some sort of pretextual 
evidence, can then considered for determining both the 
truthfulness and 
purposes m statements relating termination of <=-
employee. Ms. Dubois - s ransf- :•• action for slander dismissed 
oased 
solely upon the representations made . to the action. 
This Is expressly contrary to the substance of Ru" 
' r I i vi i Pro i/edui, v te idling to summary judgments wherein the court 
i s to determine genuine issue of material fact 
exists, and :t sue*- c> * 
permit the case ^ , :;e •-i-• Genuine 
facts were presented , ;;;1 controverted. ~ •• J.40-145, 
146- I Lit1 i„ , 'I'l.r- ,< . - .*,-; 
The Trial Court has effectively created impenetrable 
shield : r an employer * <—: hatevei !a- chooses about employees, 
whet i ii/j
 i U p ^ 0 y e r c a n ^ a v e other current 
employees testify they investigated the facts and support them, 
whether or not they really di d investigate i whei"K^ i imi i in 
:ii nvestigation was reasonable, 01" whether \hey had any 
responsibility to do so, the employee then can present no evidence 
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to the contrary. Our courts have never been so one-sided. The 
summary judgment decision of the Trial Court must be revered 
regarding the dismissal of Ms. Dubois' cause of action for slander. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court in this instance construed the facts in 
favor of the moving party (Fred Meyer); a violation of the rule 
and substance regarding summary judgments. 
The Trial Court failed to give the appropriate inferences 
to the multiple facts produced in opposition to Fred Meyer's motion 
by Ms. Dubois and also construed Utah law in such a manner as to 
totally exclude an employee from presenting his or her evidence to 
a finder of fact for review even when an employment agreement 
exists and when serious questions concerning the actions of one 
side to issue have been raised. 
The Trial Court refused to permit evidence to be 
presented to a fact finder on questions regarding the 
reasonableness, allegedly substantial, reckless, truthful and good 
or bad faith actions of the employer. All these issues are factual 
in nature. All were alleged and contested in the motion for 
summary judgment. 
For the same reason, the Trial Court resolved all these 
issues in favor of the employer. Employees in Utah now have 
absolutely no rights of due process under this decision. Ms. 
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Dubois respectfully requests this Court not to make such a sad 
condition permanent. 
DATED this <2%«U day of f^kcSL^lc^^ , 199J^. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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